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This paper studies how a preference for consistency can affect economic decision-making. 
We propose a two-period model where people have a preference for consistency because 
consistent behavior allows them to signal personal and intellectual strength. We then present 
three experiments that study main predictions and implications of the model. The first is a 
simple principal-agent experiment that shows that consistency is valued by others and that 
this value is anticipated. The second experiment underlines the crucial role of early 
commitment for consistency preferences. Finally we show how preferences for consistency 
can be used to manipulate choices. 
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The desire to be and appear consistent is a powerful determinant of human behavior.
Once we have made a decision or taken a stand, we often experience pressure to live up
to that commitment. In this paper, we develop a simple model that species motives and
conditions that lead to consistent behavior. This allows predicting the role of consistency
in dierent decision contexts. Moreover, we provide results from three experiments and a
survey study that test the main predictions and implications of the model and underscore
the behavioral importance of consistency preferences.
Our model is built on the notion that consistent behavior is associated with \personal
and intellectual strength" (Cialdini, 1984). Evidence from social psychology suggests that
while consistency signals positive personality traits, inconsistent behavior is generally
associated with undesirable personal characteristics (see Asch, 1956 or Allgeier, Byrne,
Brooks and Revnes, 1979). Inconsistent beliefs, words or deeds are often indicative of
confusion or even mental illness. In the model decision-makers signal positive traits
when acting consistently. There are two types of decision-makers who repeatedly face
the same choice problem. Types with high personal and intellectual strength perfectly
know their preferred outcome while types with low strength are uncertain about it. Before
making a decision, low strength types receive noisy signals about their preferred outcome.
Regarding behavior over time, high strength types make consistent choices. However, the
beliefs, and consequently the choices, of low strength types can be inconsistent. Thus
personal and intellectual strength is associated with consistent choices.
We assume that decision-makers' utility consists of two parts, a \standard" part
reecting material concerns and a reputational part capturing decision-makers' image
concerns for strength. This creates a trade-o between choosing according to updated
beliefs and reputational concerns. We show the existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium where decision-makers display preferences for consistency because consistent behav-
ior allows them to signal high personal and intellectual strength. The model allows for
several interpretations. The value of signaling can be interpreted as hedonic, i.e., peo-
ple like it if others think positively about them, or as strategic in the sense that people
expect benets from future interactions, e.g., in the labor market. Depending on the
context signaling of strength is related to ability and knowledge, identity and personality
or predictability and reliability. Finally, the recipient of the signal can be others but also
the decision-maker himself. In this case the decision-maker learns about her own type by
observing and inferring from her own behavior (e.g., as in B enabou and Tirole, 2004 and
22006).
In the second part of the paper we report evidence from three decision experiments
and a survey study. The rst experiment tests the basic logic of our model in a simple
principal-agent framework. We address two questions: do principals value consistency of
agents and is this value anticipated by agents? In the experiment the decision context is
a simple estimation task. Principals receive information about the estimation behavior of
two agents and need to select one for an additional estimation task. We nd that agents
who estimate more consistently have a signicantly higher chance of being selected by
principals. Anticipating the value of consistency, agents' estimates in this treatment are
more consistent than in a control treatment where we eliminated the strategic value of
consistency.
The second experiment studies the role of early commitment for the preference for
consistency. Intuitively, actively committing to an opinion, belief, intention or action is
a precondition for observing consistent or inconsistent behavior. Without commitment,
i.e., without taking a stand or an action, possible inconsistencies are impossible to detect.
In a simple estimation context subjects have to perform an estimation task and receive
valuable information regarding the solution of the task. In the main treatment, subjects
commit to a rst estimate prior to receiving the helpful information and without knowing
that they will later receive it. After they have received this information they are free to
revise their rst estimate. In the control treatment, no prior commitment is made. We
nd that the deviation of the nal estimate from the valuable information is signicantly
higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Prior commitment makes
subjects neglect valuable information leading to lower payos.
In the third experiment we examine the role of consistency preferences as a means
of social inuence. The trick is to \tempt" a person to make a biased statement. In a
second step she is confronted with a request related to that statement and the pressure
to live up to it. Provided that the rst statement involves little to no cost, it is relatively
easy to provoke biased statements. The preference for consistency will make the person
want to live up to the biased statement and act against her actual interest. We test this
prediction in the context of pro-social decision-making. We nd that pro-social behavior
in the presence of biased statements systematically diers from behavior in a control
treatment where no rst statements were made. Finally, in our survey study we show
how the preference for consistency can be used to manipulate subjects' responses on a
particular matter, simply by adding an additional related question to the survey.
3Our work is related to a literature in social psychology. Cialdini (1984) summarizes
much of the evidence and discusses several explanations for consistent behavior. In partic-
ular he highlights the role of consistency as a signal of positive attitudes. An alternative
interpretation of consistent choices relies on the notion of cognitive dissonance. This
approach basically assumes that consistent behavior reects a desire to avoid cognitive
dissonances. Early work in this direction was developed in Heider (1946), Newcomb
(1953) and Festinger (1957).1 Another potential driver of consistent behavior is based on
the idea that thinking is not costless. If thinking does involve cognitive costs, it may in
fact be optimal to stick to a particular behavioral strategy and not to change behavior in
response to new information or new signals. It is likely that these motives all play some
role and often act in concert. Note, however, that neither cognitive dissonance nor cost of
thinking are sucient to explain all results of our experiments. In particular, treatment
dierences in our rst experiment (repeated estimations with and without the presence
of a principal) can be explained in terms of our model and the notion that consistency
signals strength. However, neither cognitive dissonance nor cost of thinking would predict
any treatment dierence.
Note that our notion of consistency is conceptually dierent from anchoring eects. In
a classical anchoring experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for example generated a
random number between 0 and 100 and asked subjects if the number of African nations in
the United Nations was greater than that number. Then they asked subjects to estimate
the number of African nations in the United Nations. They nd that the randomly
generated number (the anchor) signicantly aected estimates. Studies on anchoring
manipulations dier from the notion of consistency in that they document eects of
random unrelated numbers on subsequent choices. In our paper, subsequent choices are
aected by prior actions or statements. In addition the role of reputation stressed in
our model is not present in work on anchoring eects, which also implies that anchoring
eects cannot explain our experimental ndings.
In the economics literature Eyster (2002) and Yariv (2005) have suggested models of
consistent behavior. In Eyster (2002) people have a taste for rationalizing past mistakes
by taking current actions that justify these mistakes. His model oers an explanation
for the well-known \sunk-cost eect". It also predicts procrastination in search contexts
and overbidding in wars of attrition. Yariv (2005) proposes a model where people have a
1Akerlof and Dickens (1982) incorporate cognitive dissonance theory into an economic model. In an
empirical study, Mullainathan and Washington (2009) examine the consequences of cognitive dissonance
in the context of voting behavior.
4taste for consistency of beliefs held over time, thereby reducing cognitive dissonance. Her
model can explain a variety of phenomena such as underpinnings of overcondence and
undercondence, persistence of actions over time or why people sometimes might prefer
to receive less accurate information. Dierent to our approach, Eyster (2002) and Yariv
(2005) directly assume a taste for consistency while in our model this taste results from a
desire to signal strength. Also, their models focus on internal consistency while our model
stresses the role of reputation for consistency preferences. Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004) and Vanberg (2008) refer to the taste for consistency as a possible reason for why
people incur costs of lying and thus keep their promises. In fact, breaking promises can
be viewed as a particularly obvious form of inconsistency. On a more general level, our
model belongs to a class of models where decision-makers try to signal positive traits
through their actions (as for example in Bernheim, 1994, Prendergast and Stole, 1996,
B enabou and Tirole, 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008 or Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce
our model. In section 3 we present the three experiments and our survey study. Section 4
concludes and discusses several implications of our work for, e.g., the design of committee
procedures or problems of self-control.
2 The Model
We model the intuition that \... a high degree of consistency is normally associated
with personal and intellectual strength." (Cialdini, 1984). We choose a very simple set-
up with two types of decision-makers who choose between two alternatives. The model
formalizes the notion of preferences for consistency and delivers behavioral predictions
for our experiments.2
2.1 Set-up
There are two periods, t = 1;2. In both periods, a decision-maker (D) chooses xt from
a choice set X = fRed;Blueg in public. D has a preferred outcome  2 X. There
are two dierent types of decision-makers. Types with high personal and intellectual
strength (type DH) perfectly know their preferred outcome . Types with low personal
2We have also developed an alternative and more general version of the model with a continuous type
and choice set. Insights and predictions of this model are qualitatively similar to the more parsimonious
set-up. We therefore decided to use the latter. The continuous version is available on request.
5and intellectual strength (type DL) are uncertain about their preferred outcome. Her
type is D's private knowledge but is commonly known to be drawn from a distribution
with probability  that D is of type DH and (1   ) that she is of type DL. Types with
low strength and the public are holding an uninformative prior on , i.e., Pr( = Red) =
Pr( = Blue) = 1
2. In both periods, before making a choice, DL privately receives a
signal mt about . Signals are of strength pt, i.e., pt = Pr(mt = Redj = Red) =
Pr(mt = Bluej = Blue). We assume that signals are informative with 1
2 < pt < 1. We
allow that the strength of signals diers between periods 1 and 2, only requiring that
p2  p1. Thus our setup captures situations where the quality of information DL receives
may change over periods. The assumption that signals in period 2 are at least as strong
as signals in period 1 is only made to focus on scenarios where contradicting signals lead
to changes in beliefs about the preferred outcome.3
Upon receiving a signal mt, DL updates beliefs about  following Bayes' rule. Through-
out the paper l(mt;mt 1) denotes DL's beliefs about  in terms of the probability she
assigns on Red being her preferred outcome conditional on signals mt and mt 1 (if mt 1
exists), i.e., l(mt;mt 1) = Pr( = Redjmt;mt 1).
Since the prior on  is uninformative, DL's updated period 1 belief is determined by
the signal she received in period 1, m1. Accordingly, the updated belief on  in period 1
is l(m1 = Red) = p1 > 1
2 and l(m1 = Blue) = (1 p1) < 1
2, respectively. In period 2, DL
receives an additional signal m2 and updates again. Thus:
(1) l(m2 = Red;m1 = Red) =
p1  p2




(2) l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red) =
p1  (1   p2)




(3) l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Blue) = 1  
p1  p2




(4) l(m2 = Red;m1 = Blue) = 1  
p1  (1   p2)




In both periods, the decision-maker chooses xt in order to maximize utility. D's
utility function consists of two components. The rst is \standard" outcome-based utility.
Standard utility is 1 if D chooses xt =  and 0 otherwise. The decision-maker also cares
about her reputation. She likes it, if the public perceives her as having high personal
3If the period 2 signal is less informative than the period 1 signal, updated period 2 beliefs always
remain in line with the signal from period 1 even in case of contradicting signals. Consequently types
DL would always choose consistently anyway.
6and intellectual strength. An alternative interpretation of the reputational concern is a
desire for a positive self-image (similar as in B enabou and Tirole, 2004 and 2006). In this
case decision-makers receive a perfect signal about their personal and intellectual strength
prior to their decision. Thus, when deciding, they know their strength. However, for their
self-assessment, this knowledge is not readily available, e.g., due to reasons of imperfect
recall. Since actions are easier to recall than signals, decision-makers use past actions for
their self-assessment. Thus the model is compatible with the intuition that people care
about their self-image and construct self-image from past actions. In the following we
describe the model mostly in terms of public reputation but always mean to include a
self-signaling interpretation. Reputational concerns are expressed by
   Pr(type = DLjxt;xt 1):
Pr(type = DLjxt;xt 1) denotes the public's (or D's) belief about D's type, condi-
tional on D's decisions in the current period xt and the previous period xt 1 (if it exists).
Parameter  is assumed to be positive and species how much D cares about her repu-
tation. Dierences in  might reect, e.g., the size and importance of the public or the
social distance between D and the public. The nature of reputational concerns could be
strategic in the sense that people expect benets in future interactions. In labor relations,
e.g., signaling higher abilities may improve hiring prospects or lead to higher wages and
promotion. Alternatively,  could reect a hedonic value of reputation. People simply
enjoy being regarded as intellectually and personally strong. Depending on the context,
personal and intellectual strength is associated with dierent personal characteristics. In
task-related choices, similar solutions to similar problems signal high ability. In repeated
social interactions, personal and intellectual strength, reected by consistent behavior,
signals predictability and reliability. These are important prerequisites for relationship
formation and trust (see Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). They also help solving coordina-
tion problems. High personal and intellectual strength is also a sign of personal identity.
Identity is shaped by past actions or statements. Without continuity in actions or state-
ments, the formation of a sense of self-identity is not possible. In that sense, high personal
and intellectual strength (via consistent behavior over time) is a prerequisite for strong
personal identity.






l(mt;mt 1)  1     Pr(type = DLjxt;xt 1) if xt = Red
(1   l(mt;mt 1))  1     Pr(type = DLjxt;xt 1) if xt = Blue:
In periods 1 and 2, DL maximizes E(Ut) facing a trade-o between maximizing
outcome-based utility and gaining reputation.4
Note that we assume myopic, non-forward looking behavior. Decision-makers are not
anticipating period 2 decisions when deciding in period 1. This can be justied in two
ways. First, we are interested in situations where future decisions are not anticipated
and believe that this is quite common. Second, and more importantly, predicted be-
havior is actually identical if decision-makers are forward looking. The reason is that
choosing according to their beliefs in period 1 is optimal not only from a standard utility
perspective. It also maximizes the likelihood of consistent behavior. It is therefore not
possible to improve in terms of consistency even in situations where the decision-maker
anticipates future decisions.
2.2 Equilibrium
We now turn to equilibrium behavior. In period 1 the equilibrium we consider is straight-
forward. D always maximizes standard utility. Types DL choose x
1 = Red if m1 = Red
and x
1 = Blue if m1 = Blue. Types DH choose their preferred outcome . Due
to the uninformative prior of the public, D cannot aect her image through x1, i.e.,
Pr(type = DLjx1 = Red) = Pr(type = DLjx1 = Blue). Thus simply maximizing stan-
dard utility is optimal and the behavior described above constitutes a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium.5
In period 2 there now exists a choice history x
1 and D faces a possible trade-o
between standard utility and reputational concerns. We characterize the equilibrium
conditional on x
1. To simplify notation we consider the case where x
1 = Red without
loss of generality.
4Utility of the high types is straightforward. Suppose a type DL with  = Red. Her utility is described
by Ut(xt) =
(
1     Pr(type = DLjxt;xt 1) if xt = Red
0     Pr(type = DLjxt;xt 1) if xt = Blue:
5As is common for this type of signaling models, there exist other equilibria. For example, if repu-
tational concerns are large enough, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where D always chooses
Red (or Blue) regardless of her beliefs about  and her type and the public holds o-equilibrium beliefs
that D is a low type, i.e., Pr(type = DLjBlue) = 1 (or Pr(type = DLjRed) = 1).
8Types DH who chose Red in period 1 know with certainty that their preferred outcome
is Red. For types DL who chose Red in period 1 we need to distinguish two possibilities.
In period 2 they either receive a signal m2 = Red or m2 = Blue. In the rst case we have
that l(m2 = Red;m1 = Red) > 1
2, in the second case l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red)  1
2. If D
would simply maximize standard utility, types DH and types DL with m2 = Red would
choose x2 = Red whereas types DL with m2 = Blue would choose x2 = Blue.6 In the
presence of image concerns however, DL types with contradicting signals face a trade-o
between maximizing standard utility and signaling personal and intellectual strength.
We show under which conditions there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in period 2
where types with low strength and contradicting signals nevertheless choose consistently,
thereby sacricing expected standard utility.
In the equilibrium, types DH, types DL with signals m2 = Red;m1 = Red and types
DL with signals m2 = Blue;m1 = Red all behave consistently choosing Red in period 2.
For this to be an equilibrium it suces to check incentive compatibility for low strength
types with contradicting signals. If incentive compatibility is fullled for these types it
is straightforward that for types DH and types DL with signals m2 = Red;m1 = Red it
is fullled as well. Decision-makers DL with signals m2 = Blue;m1 = Red hold beliefs
l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red)  1
2. We need to check that they are better o choosing
Red than choosing Blue. Standard utility is l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red)  1 when they
choose Red and (1 l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red))1 when they choose Blue. Reputational
utility is    Pr(type = DLjRed;Red) =    (1   ) if they choose consistently and
  Pr(type = DLjBlue;Red) =   if they choose inconsistently.7 We end up with the
following condition: DL's with contradicting signals prefer Red over Blue if
    1   2  l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red):
The above condition captures the trade-o between standard utility and reputational
concerns. The left hand side describes reputational gains from choosing consistently while
the right hand side represents the costs in terms of standard utility. If image concerns are
suciently high, decision-makers display a preference for consistency because consistent
6If signals in periods 1 and 2 are of equal strength, DL's with contradicting signals are indierent in
terms of standard utility between Red and Blue.
7Note that we assume o-equilibrium beliefs such that the public infers low personal and intellectual
strength from inconsistent behavior. We believe that this assumption is plausible. High types know
their preferred outcome with certainty. Consequently they have the highest expected costs in terms of
standard utility from choosing inconsistently. Also, if only a small fraction of decision-makers would
not have any reputational concerns and only maximize standard utility, only low types would choose
inconsistently. In addition, our equilibrium satises the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
9behavior allows them to signal personal and intellectual strength. Note that if reputa-
tional concerns are small, there exists an equilibrium in period 2 where D always chooses
to maximize standard utility. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume w.l.g. that x
1 = Red. If reputational concerns  are
suciently large, i.e.,     1   2  l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red), there exists a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium in period 2, where D always chooses x
2 = x
1 = Red.
Proposition 1 states the main result of our model, namely, that decision-makers have
a preference for consistent behavior. In period 2, decision-makers do not simply maximize
standard outcome-based utility. Instead, they act consistently with their period 1 choice
in order to signal high personal and intellectual strength. Thus, in equilibrium, they are
willing to sacrice outcome-based utility to increase their reputational utility.
3 Experimental Evidence
In this section we present evidence from three experiments designed to test the basic
logic of the model and to examine dierent applications of preferences for consistency. In
particular we address the following issues: First, we study the signal value of consistent
behavior in the context of a simple principal agent game. In the second experiment we
investigate the role of commitment. The idea is that without explicit commitment to
some point of view, statement or intention, inconsistencies are impossible to detect and
consequently costs of inconsistency are less important. Our third experiment demon-
strates the importance of consistency preferences for social inuence and manipulation.
In addition, we present evidence from a study that shows how the taste for consistency
can be used to manipulate survey answers.8
3.1 Experiment 1: The Value of Consistency
Design: The rst experiment tests the central assumption of the model, that consistent
behavior is valued. In the experiment the decision context involves a simple estimation
task. We test whether principals infer higher ability from more consistent estimates and
whether agents anticipate this.
8Instructions for the three experiments and the complete survey can be found in Appendix C.
10We ran two treatments. In the main treatment, upon arrival, subjects were ran-
domly assigned to the roles of principals and agents.9 In each session there were twice
as many agents as principals. Subjects were seated in separate rooms according to their
roles. The experiment involved two stages. All subjects were informed about both stages
at the beginning. In the rst stage, agents had to perform two estimation tasks. Both
tasks consisted of estimating how many times the letter \e" appeared in a text with 1,966
letters. We had selected two texts where the number of e's was identical. Both, agents
and principals were informed about this. The correct number was 233. Subjects saw the
rst text for 60 seconds on their computer screen. Then they had 60 seconds to state
their estimate about the number of e's (rst estimate). Without getting any feedback
on the rst task, agents then saw the second text for 60 seconds. Again they had 60
seconds to provide their estimate for the second text (second estimate). Subjects were
paid for accuracy. For both estimates the following rule applied: The maximum prot
for each estimate was ve Euro, which the agent received if her estimate was less than
1 percent above or below the correct number. For every percentage point the estimate
deviated from the correct number, 10 Cents were deducted. If the estimate was more
than 50 percent above or below the true value, prots were zero. Negative earnings were
not possible.
After all agents had completed their two estimates, the second stage began. Two
agents were randomly assigned to one principal. The decision of the principal was to
select one of the two agents for a third estimation task, which was known to be similar to
the rst two estimation tasks. The principal was paid according to the precision of the
estimate in this third task. Thus principals had an incentive to select the agent who they
thought is most able in the estimation task. For their decision, principals were informed
about the absolute dierence between the rst and the second estimate for both agents
assigned to them. This information was provided on an answer sheet.10 Note that we
did not display the four single estimates of the two agents. The reason is that we wanted
to allow principals only the kind of inference the public can make in our model. More
precisely, if we would have given principals the four single estimates, the two estimates of
agent 1 would serve as a signal about the true preferences of agent 2, given that both have
the same preference  (they want to estimate the identical number). If principals observe
this signal, agents' two estimates reveal dierent information about D's strength than in
9In the instructions we used a neutral framing. Subjects were called \participants A" and \partici-
pants B", respectively.
10Information was provided anonymously, i.e., principals could not link information to actual subjects
in the experiment.
11the absence of that knowledge. Therefore we decided only to provide absolute dierences
between estimates to the principals, thereby only allowing the kind of inference on D's
strength that is assumed in our model.
On their answer sheet principals had to select \their" agent. The third task was to
estimate how many times the letter \a" appears in a text of again 1966 letters. Principals
were paid according to the accuracy of the selected agent's third estimate. The maximum
payo was ten Euro, which was paid if the agent's estimate was less than 1 percent above
or below the correct number. For every percentage point the estimate deviated from the
correct number, 20 Cents were deducted. If the estimate was more than 50 percent above
or below the correct value, principal's payo was zero. Agents had an incentive to be
selected and to estimate as precise as possible in the third task. They received a prize of
10 Euro for being selected. In addition, they were paid according to accuracy identically
to the payment scheme in the rst two estimates.
Principals' selection decisions inform us about the potential value of estimating con-
sistently. However, to examine whether agents anticipate this value and actually behave
more consistently we need an additional treatment that eliminates (or reduces) the im-
portance of reputational concerns for consistency. This is what we do in the control
treatment. The control treatment was simply the rst stage of the main treatment, i.e.,
agents estimate how many times the letter \e" appeared in the two texts used in the
main treatment. The payo scheme for the two tasks was identical to that of the main
treatment. Comparing behavior between the two treatments informs us whether agents
anticipate the value of consistency and therefore behave more consistently in the main
treatment.
Procedural Details: A total of 168 subjects participated in six sessions. In the
main treatment, 64 subjects participated as agents and 32 as principals. 72 subjects
participated in the control treatment. Subjects were mostly students from various elds
at the University of Bonn and were recruited using the online recruitment system by
Greiner (2003). No subject participated in more than one session. The experiment was
run using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The principals made
their choice on an answer sheet. Sessions lasted on average about 60 minutes in the main
treatment and 45 minutes in the control treatment. Average earnings were 12.90 Euro for
principals and 12.06 Euro for agents, including a show-up fee of eight Euro for principals
and four Euro for agents.11
11One Euro was worth about 1.35 U.S. dollar at the time.
12Hypotheses: Principals value consistent behavior. They infer high ability from
consistent estimates. Thus agents who estimate more consistently should have a higher
probability of being selected by principals. In our model the value of consistency is ex-
pressed as an increase in the reputational concern . While reputational concerns in
the control treatment (c) are not necessarily zero (e.g., due to self-signaling motives),
reputational concerns in the main treatment (m) are higher, i.e., m > c. This follows
simply from the strategic value of reputation for high ability. In the main treatment we
implemented a tournament incentive structure where agents win a prize if they outper-
form the other agent. These tournament incentives lead to a strategic value of behaving
consistently that is not present in the control treatment. A higher  leads to greater
importance of the desire to be and appear consistent relative to the goal of maximizing
standard utility. Consequently, the likelihood of an equilibrium where all decision-makers
behave consistently is higher in the main treatment compared to the control treatment.
Proposition 1 states the condition under which an equilibrium where all decision-makers
act consistently exists:     1   2  l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Red). It can be easily seen
that an increase in  makes the fulllment of this condition more likely.12 Our main
hypotheses can be summarized as follows:
HYPOTHESIS EXPERIMENT 1: (i) The likelihood that an agent is selected by a
principal decreases in the absolute dierence between rst and second estimate. (ii) The
absolute dierence between rst and second estimate is smaller in the main treatment
than in the control treatment.
Results: The rst result concerns the selection decisions of principals. In line with
our hypothesis, a higher absolute dierence between the two estimates decreases the
likelihood of being selected. Figure 1 shows that the likelihood of being selected is about
70 percent for dierences between zero and ve and declines for larger dierences. For
dierences larger than 31, e.g., the likelihood drops to about 22 percent. The decrease
in likelihood is signicant as shown by a simple Probit regression. When we regress
the probability of being selected on the absolute dierences between the estimates we
get a negative and signicant coecient (p-value <0.01). The marginal eect is -0.012,
indicating that an increase in the absolute dierence by one point decreases the likelihood
of being selected by about 1.2 percent. Further evidence comes from the observation that
12The simplistic character of this prediction follows from the simple structure of our model. A more
general version of the model makes the prediction that an increase in reputational concerns should make
all decision-makers behave more consistently, leading to a shift in the distribution of distances between
the two estimates. This version with a continuous type and choice set is available upon request.
13among all principals 75 percent select the agent with the smaller absolute dierence. A






































































Absolute Difference Between Estimates
Figure 1: Probability of being selected by principal dependent on the absolute dierence between two
estimates.
We now turn to agents' behavior. The correct answer for both estimations was 233.
Using all estimates (main and control treatment), the average rst estimate was 220.57
while the average second estimate was 215.64.13 The variance in estimates was rather
high. The standard deviation of all estimates in the rst task was 83.29, in the second
it was 74.39. At the end of the experiment, we asked agents in the control treatment
to briey describe their estimation strategy for the two estimation tasks.14 Almost all
decision-makers who answered the question described a similar procedure. First they
counted the number of e's for a couple of rows. Then they counted the total amount of
rows in the text and projected the total number of e's in the text.
Given principals' behavior, the model predicts that agents choose more consistently
in the main than in the control treatment. This is in fact what we nd. Figure 2
shows scatterplots of rst and second estimates. The left panel displays observations
from the control treatment, the right panel from the main treatment. While estimates
are correlated in both treatments, the correlation is much tighter in the main treatment,
i.e., decisions are more consistent. The correlation coecients are 0.37 in the control
13The result that the average estimate from a large population is close to the true value is also referred
to as the \wisdom of the crowds" (see for example Surowiecki, 2004).
14The question we asked was the following: \Please briey describe how you proceeded in the two


















































Figure 2: Scatterplots of rst and second estimates for both treatments.
treatment and 0.94 in the main treatment, respectively. Figure 3 shows a histogram
of absolute dierences between the two estimates for both treatments. While about 70
percent of agents report an estimation dierence below 15 in the main treatment, the
respective number is only 25 percent in the control treatment. More than 40 percent of
agents in the control treatment indicated dierences larger than 30 while less than 15
percent did so in the main treatment. The average absolute dierence between estimates
in the control treatment is 53.8 (std. dev. 70.5) while it is only 17.3 (std. dev. 23.2)
in the main treatment. This dierence is signicant at any conventional level (p-value
< 0.0001, using either Wilcoxon rank-sum test or simple OLS regression, regressing the
absolute dierence on a constant and a treatment dummy).
Our design also allows us to test whether consistent estimates are indeed a signal of
estimation ability. While types with high personal and intellectual strength (in this case
high estimation ability) should solve the estimation tasks very well and give consistent
estimates, low strength types only receive noisy signals and therefore are likely to give
inconsistent estimates. Thus, on average, more consistent agents (low absolute dier-
ence between estimates) should give better estimates. While this should hold true for
the control treatment, the correlation between consistency of estimates and estimation
ability might be less tight in the main treatment. The reason is that given the strategic
value of consistency in the main treatment, low types should try to imitate high types by
estimating consistently. In this pooling equilibrium consistency will be less informative


















































Absolute Difference Between Estimates
Figure 3: Relative frequency of deviations between estimates for both treatments.
In the control treatment smaller dierences between estimates do reect dierences in es-
timation ability. More consistent agents are more able: The correlation between absolute
dierence in estimates and precision of estimates (measured as the sum of absolute dis-
tance between rst estimate and true value and second estimate and true value) is strong
and signicantly positive (corr. coecient is 0.429, with p-value <0.001)).15 Thus using
the dierence between the estimates as a signal of ability is generally justied. Note,
however, that the informativeness of dierences in estimates as a signal of estimation
ability basically vanishes in the main treatment. The correlation between absolute dif-
ference in estimates and precision of estimates in the main treatment is not signicantly
dierent from zero. This suggests, in line with our model, that in the main treatment
we have a pooling equilibrium where types with low personal and intellectual strength
imitate types with high strength by estimating consistently. In this pooling equilibrium,
consistency of estimates loses its informativeness on estimation ability. We summarize
our main results as follows:
RESULT EXPERIMENT 1: The likelihood of being selected decreases in the absolute
dierence between the two estimates. Agents anticipate this. As a consequence, the
absolute dierence between rst and second estimate is signicantly lower in the main
treatment, compared to the control treatment.
15A simple OLS regression, regressing precision of estimates on a constant and the absolute dierence in
estimates in the control treatment delivers the same results (coecient of absolute dierence in estimates
is 0.569, with p-value < 0.001).
163.2 Experiment 2: The Role of Commitment
Our second experiment studies the role of early commitment. Intuitively, actively com-
mitting to an opinion, belief, intention or action is a precondition for observing consistent
or inconsistent behaviors. Without commitment, i.e., without taking a stand or an action,
observers will not be able to detect possible inconsistencies. Therefore, a decision-maker
is not constrained by reputational concerns and can maximize utility without taking rep-
utational costs into account. In contrast, once an individual has committed to an opinion
or belief, she cannot easily change her mind without revealing some inconsistency. We
test this intuition and prediction of our model in the context of an estimation task and
show how commitment to an opinion can make people disregard valuable information.
Design: We study two treatments, one with commitment (main treatment) and
one without (control treatment). The dierent steps of the experiment are illustrated
in Figure 4. The main treatment is shown in the upper panel. First, subjects were
explained the task: Subjects had to estimate the number of peas in a bowl.16 Subjects
were paid according to the precision of their estimate. If their estimate was less than 5
percentage points above or below the true value of 3000, subjects earned 10 Euro. For
every 5 percentage points the estimate deviated from the true value, we deducted 50
Cents. For example, a subject whose estimate deviated 17 percent from the true value
earned 8.50 Euro. Negative earnings from the estimation task were not possible.
Subjects were seated around a table which was placed in the middle of the lab.17 After
subjects had been informed about the task the bowl was shown. The bowl with peas was
placed in the middle of the table. Subjects were asked to raise their hand once they had
written down their estimate on an answer sheet that had been distributed at the beginning
of the experiment. As soon as a subject indicated that he or she had written down an
estimate, the experimenter went to the subject and recorded the subject's estimate. This
means that subjects had written down their rst estimate and knew that the experimenter
knew this estimate. At this point, subjects had committed to their rst estimate. After
all subjects had stated their estimates, the experimenter announced that he would now
provide subjects with additional and \helpful" information regarding the estimation task.
Each subject received an information sheet containing the following sentence. \In the
past it has often been the case in various estimation tasks, that the average estimate of all
participants is often relatively close to the true value. The estimation task you are facing
16A picture of the bowl is shown in Appendix A.
17Subjects were seated suciently far away from each other, such that they could not see what other
subjects were writing down.
17has also been conducted with a dierent group of participants. They have also been paid
according to precision of their estimates. The average estimate of the number of peas
in the bowl of this group was 2615. If you want to, you can now revise your estimate."
After they received the information sheet, subjects had time to revise their estimate on
their answer sheet. Of course, only the nal estimate was relevant for earnings. After
all subjects had indicated that they had specied their nal estimate, the experimenter
collected their answer sheets and the estimation task ended.
Figure 4: Timing of the experiment
The additional information we provided to subjects was based on a separate experi-
ment we had conducted with 61 dierent subjects. They faced the same estimation task
and were also paid according to the precision of their estimates. The average estimate of
that group was 2615. In the results section we show that the additional information was
in fact valuable to subjects.
Subjects in the control treatment also learned about the task and were asked to
provide an estimate. The only dierence between main and control treatment was that in
the latter subjects did not state an estimate prior to receiving the additional information
(see lower panel of Figure 4). In the control treatment, subjects saw the bowl with peas
for some time prior to receiving the information sheets.18 The time was approximated to
be the same as what subjects in the main treatment needed. During this time subjects
could form a belief about the correct number of peas, but did not state this to the
18Note that in both treatments subjects did not know that they would receive helpful information
before they actually received it.
18experimenter, i.e., no commitment to a rst estimate was made. After subjects received
the information sheets, they stated their estimate on their answer sheet. Answer sheets
were collected by the experimenter and the estimation task ended.
Procedural Details: A total of 54 subjects participated in four sessions, 28 in the
main and 26 in the control treatment. Subjects were mostly undergraduate students from
various elds at the University of Bonn and were recruited using the online recruitment
system by Greiner (2003). No subject participated in more than one session. The experi-
ment was conducted with paper and pencil. Sessions lasted on average about 40 minutes.
Subjects earned on average 12.31 Euro, including a show-up fee of 5 Euro.
Hypotheses: Here we present the intuition of our model's prediction. A formal
prediction is derived in Appendix B. In both treatments subjects see the bowl and form a
belief about the correct number of peas. In the main treatment subjects commit to their
belief by stating it towards the experimenter. Then, in both treatments subjects receive
a public signal, i.e., valuable information. In the main treatment subjects necessarily
reveal inconsistency if they respond to the public signal by changing their nal estimate
accordingly. On the contrary, subjects in the control treatment can respond to the public
signal without revealing inconsistency due to the lack of commitment to their prior belief.
Therefore the preference for consistency will make subjects partially neglect the valuable
information in the main treatment. Consequently nal estimates in the main treatment
will be further away from the public signal than in the control treatment. Since subjects
in the main treatment disregard valuable information, it follows directly that the quality
of estimates and therefore earnings are lower in the main than in the control treatment.19
We summarize our hypothesis as follows:
HYPOTHESIS EXPERIMENT 2: The absolute dierence between the nal estimate
and the information value of 2615 should be higher in the main treatment, compared to
the control treatment. Final estimates in the main treatment will be further away from
the correct value of 3000 compared to the control treatment.
Results: Pooling data from both treatments the average (nal) estimate was 2552.50.
The estimation problem is very dicult and answers ranged from 500 to 5800. Accord-
ingly, the variance was large as indicated by a standard deviation of 1021.87. We chose
19We abstract here from self-signaling motives. Subjects could signal strength towards themselves
by being consistent with their private belief. Since this motive is present in both treatments, it does
not change our predictions. One might even argue that self-signaling should be stronger in the main
treatment. There private beliefs might be more salient for self-evaluation because they were actually
stated.
19a dicult task on purpose as it oers an ideal context to provide subjects with helpful
information. To show that the public signal was in fact valuable we simply count the
number of subjects in the main treatment whose estimate in the rst estimation was
closer to 3000 than 2615. It turns out that this holds for only 5 out of 28 subjects. This
means that about 82 percent of subjects could improve their (rst) estimate by simply
















































Figure 5: Relative frequency of nal estimates centered around public signal (2615) for both treatments.
We now turn to our main variable of interest, the absolute deviation between nal
estimate and the public signal of 2615. Figure 5 shows a histogram of estimates in
intervals of 300 around the information value. In the control treatment, about 54 percent
of all estimates are in the interval +/-300 around the information value. In contrast only
about 28 percent of all estimates in the main treatment lie within this interval. The gure
also shows that extreme deviations from the public signal are more frequent in the main
treatment than in the control treatment. On average, the deviation in the main treatment
is 464.13 points higher than in the control treatment. The dierence in deviations from
the public signal is statistically signicant (p-value < 0.07, using Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(two-sided) or simple OLS regression, regressing the absolute dierence on a constant
and a treatment dummy (p-value < 0.02)).
Figure 6 suggests that early commitment in the main treatment aects subjects' nal
estimate. The gure depicts a scatterplot with subjects' rst and nal estimates together
with a line indicating the public signal 2615. This reveals that many subjects are either at
or close to the 45-degree line indicating a strong resistance to take into account new and
20valuable information. It also shows that if subjects change, they change in the direction
of 2615, as predicted by the model. The correlation between rst and nal estimate is
0.53 (p-value < 0.004).
The disregard of the valuable public signal is associated with a decrease in the quality
of estimates and earnings. On average, estimates in the main treatment are 512.46 points
further away from the correct value than estimates in the control treatment. The eect
is statistically signicant (p-value < 0.03, using Wilcoxon rank-sum test (two-sided) or
simple OLS regression, regressing the deviation from the true value on a constant and a
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of rst and nal estimates in main treatment.
Note that our ndings cannot be explained by subjects putting higher eort into form-
ing a private belief in the main treatment. While given our experimental setup we believe
it is plausible to assume that the quality of private signals is the same across treatments,
one might argue that for some reason subjects in the main treatment try harder and thus
receive better private signals. Consequently, subjects in the main treatment should also
put higher weight on their private signals relative to the public signal in the Bayesian
updating process. However, this does not necessarily explain that the absolute dierence
between nal estimate and public signal is higher in the main treatment. The reason is
that higher eort should make rst estimates \better" and thus they should be closer
to the valuable public signal to begin with, thereby reducing the deviation between -
nal estimates and the public signal. Also, higher estimation eort would predict a higher
quality of nal estimates in the main treatment compared to the control treatment, which
21is exactly the opposite of what we nd. We summarize our results as follows:
RESULT EXPERIMENT 2: Commitment is key: it induces subjects to act consistently
at the cost of neglecting valuable information and receiving lower payos.
3.3 Experiment 3: Social Inuence
In our third experiment we address the issue of social inuence. The idea is that, given
a preference for consistency, it is possible to inuence and manipulate people's decisions.
The trick is to \tempt" a person to make a biased statement. In a second step, she
is confronted with a request related to that statement and the pressure to live up to
it. Provoking a statement that does not necessarily reect a person's true preferences is
relatively easy if the statement involves no or only low costs. As a result the person may
end up acting against her actual interest.20
Design: We study social inuence in the context of prosocial decision-making. Sub-
jects' decision is how much money to donate to a charitable fund. To study the potential
of inuence we conduct two treatments: In the main treatment subjects are asked how
much they would donate if they were asked, prior to their donation decision. In the
control treatment this question is not asked. Due to the preference for consistency, biases
in prior statements (\I would donate...") might carry on to later choices because people
feel obliged to act consistently with the original statement.
In both treatments, the experiment started with a survey. Subjects did not know that
they would later be asked to donate money. The survey consisted of 19 sub-questions and
took about 10 minutes. The survey included a short version of the so-called \Big Five"
inventory and some quiz type questions. The only dierence between the two treatments
was that in the main treatment, we inserted one additional question in between the
\Big Five" and the quiz questions. We asked subjects how they would hypothetically
decide if they were asked to donate money. The question read as follows: \Imagine, in an
experiment you received an amount of 15 Euro in addition to your show-up fee. You had
to choose, which part of the 15 Euro you want to donate to a charitable organization.
You could choose between dierent organizations and could donate any amount from 0 to
15. How much would you donate? Please indicate an amount between 0 and 15." In the
20In the psychology literature, this two step procedure is also known as foot-in-the-door technique.
Famous examples are Freedman and Fraser (1966) and Sherman (1980) who analyze the eectiveness
of the foot-in-the-door technique in dierent contexts, e.g., the willingness to engage in embarrassing
behavior or the willingness to participate in a large consumer survey.
22control treatment, we removed this question from the questionnaire. After all subjects
had completed the survey, the donation experiment was announced.
In the donation experiment, subjects received an endowment of 15 Euro and had to
decide how much of the endowment to donate to a charity organization, and how much
to keep for themselves. They could donate any amount from 0 to 15. In case they
wanted to donate a positive amount, subjects could choose their preferred charitable
organizations: they could either choose from a list of 8 organizations, or could name a
charity organization of their own.21
Note that the only dierence between the two treatments was the hypothetical dona-
tion question. Moreover, the question was not asked right before the actual experiment
but was instead embedded in a survey. The quiz questions were used to introduce some
\distraction" between prior statements and donation experiment. We also did not remind
subjects of their answers to the donation question when presenting the experiment. It
is possible that the eects reported below would become stronger if we had either asked
the question right before the experiment or reminded subjects about their answers.
Procedural Details: A total of 64 subjects participated in four sessions, 32 in the
main treatment and 32 in the control treatment. Subjects were mostly undergraduate
students from various elds at the University of Bonn and were recruited using the online
recruitment system by Greiner (2003). No subject participated in more than one session.
The experiment was conducted with paper and pencil. Sessions lasted on average about
40 minutes and subjects earned on average 13.50 Euro, including a show-up fee of 5 Euro.
Hypotheses: We hypothesized that subjects would give a biased answer when asked
hypothetically how much to donate to a charitable organization.22 In fact we were ex-
pecting them to overstate their willingness to donate given that donating to charity is
socially desired, and given that it was essentially costless to signal positive characteris-
tics. Note, however, that from the viewpoint of the model it makes no dierence whether
they over- or understate their true willingness to donate. In the main treatment, subjects
face a trade-o between acting consistently with their biased prior statement and act-
ing according to their unbiased beliefs about their true preferences. Subjects solve this
21The list of organizations consists of very well-known and respected charities covering various targets
such as helping children, ghting poverty or environmental protection. Organizations are: Brot f ur
die Welt, Kindernothilfe, German Red Cross, Welthungerhilfe, BUND, Greenpeace, terre des hommes,
Aktion Mensch.
22The model does not explain why people may give biased responses, it has to assume them. Possible
reasons discussed in the literature are biases due to bounded rationality such as gambler's fallacy, base
rate neglect, or hot hand fallacy (see for example Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, Grether, 1980, Charness
and Levin, 2005 or Dohmen et al., 2009) or the signaling of pro-social or other motives that do not
necessarily correspond to true underlying preferences (see for example B enabou and Tirole, 2006).
23trade-o by choosing an actual donation level consistent with their biased statement. In
the control treatment, subjects don't face such a trade-o and simply choose according
to their unbiased beliefs. Therefore, actual donations in the main treatment should be
higher or lower than donations in the control treatment, depending on the direction of
the bias.23
HYPOTHESIS EXPERIMENT 3: Subjects' actual donation decision in the main
treatment will be biased in the direction of their hypothetical statement. As a
consequence, they will donate more or less in the main than in the control treatment,
depending on the direction of the bias.
Results: First we check whether subjects gave a biased hypothetical statement about
their willingness to donate. To do so we compare hypothetical donations in the main
treatment with actual donations in the control treatment. It turns out there is a striking
bias: While average hypothetical donations are 4.27 Euro actual donations in the control
treatment are 7.63 Euro. Thus actual donations in the control treatment are almost 80
percent higher (!) than hypothetical donations. This dierence is statistically signicant
at any conventional level (p-value < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The sign of the
bias is quite surprising. A possible explanation is that in the actual donation decision
we presented a list of eight charitable organizations, which may have made donations
more concrete and credible, triggering a higher willingness to donate. In the hypothetical
question we mentioned that subjects could choose between dierent charities but did not
explicitly name any organizations.
Regardless of the sign of the bias, the interesting question is whether the bias carries
over to the actual donation decision in the main treatment. Given that the bias is nega-
tive, the model predicts lower donations in the main compared to the control treatment.
This is in fact the case. Figure 7 shows a histogram of actual donations in both treat-
ment conditions. 38 percent of donations in the main treatment are 3 Euro or lower, the
corresponding fraction in the control treatment is only about 13 percent. Likewise the
fraction of donations higher or equal to 12 Euro is more than twice as high in the control
compared to the main treatment. On average subjects donate 5.38 Euro in the main and
7.63 Euro in the control treatment, i.e., donations are about 42 percent lower in the main
treatment than in the control condition. This dierence is statistically signicant using
either a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value < 0.03, two-sided) or simple OLS regression,
















































Figure 7: Relative frequency of donations for both treatments.
regressing donations on a constant and a treatment dummy (p-value < 0.02)). Additional
evidence for the importance of the consistency bias comes from the scatterplot shown in
Figure 8. It shows that many subjects donated exactly the same amount as previously
stated (almost 66 percent). The correlation coecient between hypothetical and actual
donations is 0.77 (p-value < 0.001). Those subjects who deviated typically increased
their donation. We summarize our results as follows:
RESULT EXPERIMENT 3: Subjects' donations are inuenced by a biased hypothetical
rst statement. The bias is negative, resulting in lower donations in the main treatment
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Figure 8: Scatterplot of hypothetical and actual donations in main treatment. Size of bubbles reects
number of observations.
253.4 Survey Manipulation
In a simple additional study, we investigate how the design of a survey can inuence and
manipulate subjects' stated opinions. We designed a survey to study attitudes on how
to punish a murderer. Subjects were asked to read a short text that described a horrible
deed of a murderer. After reading the text subjects were asked to answer the following
question: \Do you agree with the following statement? I would approve if the oender
would be sent to prison for the rest of his life, never to be released." Subjects could either
agree or disagree with the statement by checking the appropriate box.
We studied two treatments. In the control treatment subjects only answered the
question described above. In the manipulation treatment, subjects had to answer a
dierent but related question rst, namely: \Do you agree with the following statement?
Everybody deserves a second chance in life. Even dangerous criminals should be released
after their imprisonment and be given a chance to start a new life." Subjects could either
agree or disagree. Once subjects had answered the question, the answer sheets were
collected and the question on how to punish the murderer was distributed.
We expected that most subjects in the control group would agree with the statement
that the murderer should be imprisoned forever. We also expected that many subjects in
the manipulation group would agree with the statement that everybody deserves a second
chance. Therefore we hypothesized that subjects in the manipulation group would feel
the desire to be consistent with their rst answer and therefore agree less frequently with
the statement that the murderer should be imprisoned forever, as compared to the control
treatment.24 The study was conducted with students from the University of Bonn. 95
subjects participated, 48 in the control treatment, 47 in the manipulation treatment.
We rst look at how many subjects in the control treatment agreed that the murderer
should be sent to prison for the rest of his life. It turns out that 44 out of 48 subjects
(91.7 percent) responded with \I agree". Then we examine how many subjects in the
manipulation treatment agreed to the statement that everybody deserves a second chance
in life. 26 out of 47 subjects (55.3 percent) responded with \I agree".
Given these results, we predict that in order to be consistent with the statement that
everybody deserves a second chance, fewer subjects in the manipulation treatment agree
to imprison the murderer forever. This is indeed what we nd. Only 32 out of 47 subjects
(68.0 percent) stated that they would approve if the oender would never live in freedom
again. Thus the approval rate dropped from 91.7 percent in the control treatment to
24In terms of our model the problem is similar to the one studied section 3.3.
2668.0 percent in the manipulation treatment. This dierence is statistically signicant
using either a Fisher exact test (p-value < 0.005) or simple Probit regression, regress-
ing a dummy variable for \agree" or \disagree" on a constant and a treatment dummy
(p-value < 0.005). To summarize, we were able to signicantly manipulate reported atti-
tudes towards the punishment of a murderer simply by including an additional question.
Together with the previous experimental results, our ndings suggest that the preference
for consistency can be used to manipulate behavior and stated preferences in a powerful
and systematic way.
4 Concluding Remarks
We presented a model that conceptualizes the preference for consistency and allows the
analysis of how it aects economic behavior. In the model, people have a preference for
consistency, because consistent behavior allows them to signal strength. We conducted
three experiments and a survey study that support main predictions and implications
of our model. In the context of an estimation task, the rst experiment shows that
consistent behavior is valued as a signal of ability. Agents anticipate this and make
more consistent estimates compared to a control treatment without principals, i.e., in a
situation where signaling ability has no strategic value. The second experiment shows that
explicit commitment is crucial for explaining preferences for consistency as commitment
is a prerequisite for detecting inconsistencies. In the experiment such a commitment
leads to a neglect of valuable information. The third experiment and the survey study
both demonstrate the eectiveness of the preference of consistency as a means of social
inuence.
In our model we highlight the role of signaling positive traits as a key driver of consis-
tent behavior. Other motives that have been discussed in the literature are reduction of
cognitive dissonance and costs of thinking (see work cited in Cialdini, 1984). The most
important dierence between a signaling argument and xed costs or cognitive dissonance
concerns the role of third parties. We believe that the presence of observers creates a
particularly strong desire to appear consistent. Moreover, our rst experiment demon-
strates that cognitive dissonance or cost of thinking alone are not sucient to understand
consistent behavior. While we cannot rule out that these two motives play a role as well,
they cannot explain observed treatment dierences. This follows simply from the fact
that both motives can be relevant in both treatments. It is also unclear how cognitive
27dissonance theory or costs of thinking can explain results from our second experiment.
If, as we assume, subjects form a belief about the correct estimate in both treatments,
the desire to avoid cognitive dissonance (by not following the public signal) should not
dier between the treatments. Also, from a cost of thinking perspective there should be
no treatment dierence in nal estimates.
Notice that we consider situations where decision-makers face the same choice prob-
lems repeatedly and where the preferred outcome, , remains constant over time. In this
situation, personal and intellectual strength is reected by consistent behavior. A good
example is decision-making related to personality or identity. The latter is not constantly
changing but remains relatively stable over long periods of time. Therefore, a person sig-
nals a strong personality by acting consistently. In changing environments where it is
commonly known that the preferred outcome changes, however, personal and intellectual
strength could mean to adjust quickly to new environments. In fact sticking to previous
points of view could be considered rigid or even stupid. For example, if subjects in our
rst or second experiment would have been told that the number of letters or peas, re-
spectively, is (very) dierent between the two estimations, choosing identical estimates
would not signal high ability but quite the opposite. Put dierently, if the circumstances
that lead to a rst decision have clearly changed before a second decision is taken, it is
not a sign of strength to stick to the rst period's choice. In this case decision-makers
will, due to reasons of consistency, make sure that the public knows that circumstances
have in fact changed. This explains why decision-makers (such as politicians) exert much
rhetoric eort to explain the reasons for why they have changed their mind and why
acting dierently should not be interpreted as inconsistent behavior.
We conclude by highlighting economic implications that could be studied in future
work. The preference for consistency makes people act against their immediate material
interest. Early statements or choices have consequences for subsequent behavior. For
instance we show that early statements on a matter can make people ignore valuable
information. This is of interest for the design of committee or jury procedures. Institu-
tionally requested commitments on a certain opinion or intention at an intermediate stage
can decrease the quality of nal choices as these potentially do not reect the full level of
available information. In the context of negotiations where full details of the negotiation
are only sequentially revealed, statements of requests at an early stage of negotiations
can increase the likelihood of negotiation failures. In the nal stage of negotiations, when
all information is revealed, negotiation outcomes below these requests cannot be reached
28without one party revealing inconsistency with early statements. This may be one reason
why early requests are often formulated rather vaguely as this makes possible inconsis-
tencies between requests and negotiation outcomes harder to detect. On the other hand,
in many bargaining situations early requests can be used strategically to increase bar-
gaining power. Take a simple ultimatum game situation where the responder can state a
minimum acceptable oer towards the proposer in the beginning. In principle this state-
ment is cheap-talk and should not aect the outcome of the game. Thus, in the actual
game the responder should nonetheless accept any positive amount and the proposer will
oer the lowest possible amount. In the presence of a desire for consistency, however, the
stated minimum acceptable oer serves as a credible commitment that the responder will
reject any oer below that because otherwise he would reveal inconsistency. Anticipating
this, the proposer may have to oer something close to the demanded minimum. Note
that the credibility of the minimum acceptable oer depends on the reputational costs
from inconsistency. Consequently, early requests made in public, e.g., in front of large
audience have a higher credibility than requests that are only stated towards the other
bargaining party.
The desire to be consistent with stated intentions can also be a powerful means to
circumvent problems of self-control. Consider smoking: A public announcement \I will
stop smoking!" creates a pressure to live up to that announcement. Continuing to smoke
is only possible at the cost of revealing some inconsistency, thereby signaling low personal
strength. Thus, explicit public commitments can be very eective in solving problems
of self-control. In fact, one reason for the eectiveness of self-help groups could be that
they \force" members to publicly announce their intentions.
Our results are also informative from a methodological point of view. When design-
ing surveys and experiments, our studies suggest interdependencies between behavior in
related experiments conducted in one session, between behavior in repeated interactions
or within-subjects designs, between experimental behavior and related questionnaire an-
swers or between dierent survey answers. Depending on the context of the experiment
or the survey study, the preference for consistency introduces a bias in behavior that
potentially confounds results.
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32Appendix A
Picture of bowl with peas: This bowl was shown to subjects in the estimation task of experiment 2.
33Appendix B
Here we derive formal predictions of our model for experiments 2 and 3.
Prediction Experiment 2
In both treatments subjects with low personal and intellectual strength (types DL) receive
a private signal m1 and a public signal (the valuable information) m
p
2 and subjects with
high personal and intellectual strength (types DH) perfectly learn the true outcome.25
We assume that the public signal is of greater strength, i.e., p
p
2 > p1 and without loss
of generality that m
p
2 = Blue. In the main treatment, low strength subjects commit to
their private signal, i.e., x1 = m1 and high strength subjects commit to the choice they
know with certainty to be true.
For subject's nal choices we proceed in two steps. First we consider an equilibrium
where low strength subjects do not respond to the public signal. We show that in the
main treatment, if reputational concerns are large enough, there exists an equilibrium
where low strength subjects do not respond to the public signal whereas in the control
treatment such an equilibrium does not exist. We then consider the equilibrium where
decision-makers fully respond to the public signal. We derive conditions for existence of
this type of equilibrium and show that these conditions are either more likely or impossible
to be fullled in the control treatment than in the main treatment.
First consider the equilibrium where D does not respond to the public signal. In
the main treatment this equilibrium is characterized as follows. High strength types
will choose the outcome they know to be true, both in the rst decision and the nal
decision. Low strength types will rst choose following their private signal m1, i.e., some
will choose x1 = Red and some x1 = Blue. Final decisions of the low types will all be
consistent, i.e., DL's who chose x1 = Red will choose x2 = Red, neglecting the public
signal. For this to be an equilibrium it suces to check incentive compatibility for low
strength types who received a private signal m1 = Red. Costs in terms of standard
utility from choosing Red over Blue are 1   2l(m
p











2(1 p1), since the public infers that the decision-maker
is a low type if she chooses inconsistently, i.e., Pr(type = DLjBlue;Red) = 1 and that












2(1 p1).26 Thus, if the following
25Types with high personal and intellectual strength of course also receive the public signal, but do
not need to respond to it since they already know the correct answer with certainty.
26In line with the baseline model we assume o-equilibrium beliefs to be such that the public infers
34condition is fullled, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the main treatment







2) + (1   )(1   p
p
2)p1 + (1   )p
p
2(1   p1)
 1   2  l(m
p
2 = Blue;m1 = Red):
In the control treatment this equilibrium is characterized by high types choosing
the outcome they know to be true, low types who received a private signal m1 = Red
choosing x = Red (thereby ignoring the public signal) and low types who received a
private signal m1 = Blue choosing x = Blue. For this to be an equilibrium we again
check incentive compatibility for low types who received a private signal m1 = Red.27
Their costs in terms of standard utility from choosing Blue are identical to above, i.e.,
1   2l(m
p
2 = Blue;m1 = Red). The reputational gains dier, however. Without com-
mitment, the public cannot infer that D is a low type from x = Blue. Instead we

































2)(1 p1)). Since costs in terms of standard utility are positive, pos-
itive reputational gains are a prerequisite for existence of this equilibrium. However,





























Thus, in the main treatment, if reputational concerns are large enough, there exists
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where types DL who received a signal m1 = Red choose
consistently and thereby ignore the public signal. This type of equilibrium does not exist
in the control treatment. Intuitively, in the main treatment low types who receive a
private signal m1 = Red can only respond to the public signal by fully revealing that
they are a low type while low types in the control treatment face lower reputational costs
since they can \hide" behind the high types that are choosing Blue.
Now consider the equilibrium where the public signal is fully taken into account. In
the main treatment this equilibrium is characterized as follows. High strength types will
choose the outcome they know to be true, both in the rst and in the nal decision.
low personal and intellectual strength from inconsistent behavior.
27Note that here we also need to check incentive compatibility for low types that received a private
signal m1 = Blue and high types who know the true outcome to be Blue. For our purposes however
it is sucient to realize that these conditions only make the existence of this type of equilibrium in the
control treatment even less likely.
35Low strength types will take a rst decision following their private signal m1, i.e., some
will choose x1 = Red and some x1 = Blue. Since the public signal m
p
2 = Blue is more
informative than the private signal, all low strength types will take the nal decision
x2 = Blue, taking the public signal fully into account. Thus, the low strength types
who received as private signal m1 = Red will behave inconsistently. For this to be an
equilibrium it suces to check incentive compatibility for low strength types who received
as private signal m1 = Red.28 Their reputational cost from choosing Blue over Red is ,
since the public infers that the decision-maker is a high type if she chooses x1 = x2 = Red,
i.e., Pr(type = DLjRed;Red) = 0 and that the decision-maker is a low type if she chooses
x1 = Red and x2 = Blue, i.e., Pr(type = DLjBlue;Red) = 1. Gains in term of standard
utility from choosing Blue over Red are 1   2l(m
p
2 = Blue;m1 = Red). Thus, if the
following condition is fullled, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the main
treatment where subjects take the public signal fully into account.
  1   2  l(m
p
2 = Blue;m1 = Red):
In the control treatment where subjects only take one decision this equilibrium is
characterized by high types choosing the outcome they know to be true and low types
choosing x = Blue regardless of their private signal m1. For this to be an equilibrium it
again suces to check incentive compatibility for low types who received a private signal
m1 = Red. Their gains in terms of standard utility from choosing Blue are identical to
above, i.e., 1 2l(m
p
2 = Blue;m1 = Red). The reputational costs, however, dier. While
the public infers a high type from x = Red, i.e., Pr(type = DLjRed) = 0, it cannot




2. We end up with the following condition for existence of a Perfect Bayesian
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)  1   2  l(m
p
2 = Blue;m1 = Red):
Comparing equilibrium conditions for both treatments, one can easily see that the






2 < 1. Thus,
an equilibrium where information is fully taken into account is less likely in the main
treatment than in the control treatment.
28For a full characterization of the equilibrium we also need to specify o-equilibrium beliefs. Again
we assume that the public infers low strength from choices x1 = Blue, x2 = Red.
36Prediction Experiment 3
Suppose a bias in the hypothetical choice in period 1. In the language of our model,
assume for example a low strength subject chooses Red in period 1 although she received
a signal m1 = Blue. Suppose the subject receives signal m2 = Blue in period 2.29 To
focus on the role of the preference for consistency as a device for social inuence, we
assume that subjects use the correct signal m1 = Blue for Bayesian updating in period
2, i.e., l(m2;m1) = l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Blue).30 In period 2, the actual decision, the





l(m2;m1)  1   (Pr(type = DLjx2;x1)) if x2 = Red
(1   l(m2;m1))  1   (Pr(type = DLjx2;x1)) if x2 = Blue:
In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, she will choose x2 = Red in order to
be consistent with her biased period 1 statement.31
In the control treatment subjects only take one unbiased choice x. Subjects receive
a signal m and choose x = m. It immediately follows that a systematic bias in the
hypothetical statements of the main treatment will carry over to actual period 2 behavior.
Consequently actual behavior will dier between the main and the control treatment.
29This case is particularly interesting because without a bias in period 1, subjects who receive signals
m1 = m2 = Blue would consistently choose x1 = x2 = Blue in equilibrium.
30If subjects would use a biased belief this would contribute to an additional bias in subjects' period
2 choice. Thus, if subjects are unaware of the bias the treatment eect would become even larger.
31Note that for x2 = Red to be optimal for the subject, the condition is dierent from the one stated
in Proposition 1. The reason is that a subject with signals m1 = m2 = Blue has higher costs (in terms
of standard utility) from choosing consistently with her biased period 1 choice. The optimality condition
for this case is     1   2  l(m2 = Blue;m1 = Blue).
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